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We evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers
using matched employer-employee panel data. Unlike previous con-
tributions, this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm, which
are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of
diversifiable risk. We allow for both temporary and permanent shocks
to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but
insure workers against permanent shocks only partially. Risk-sharing
considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings
variability, the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to in-
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dividual workers. Our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an
important vehicle of insurance provision.
I. Introduction
The idea that an intrinsic component of the entrepreneur-worker re-
lationship is the allocation of risk has a long tradition in economics,
dating back at least to Knight (1921), who ascribes the very existence
of the firm to its role as an insurance provider.1 This view underlies the
theory of the firm as an insurance device formalized in the implicit
contract model of Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975): risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs provide insurance to risk-averse workers and insulate their
salaries from adverse shocks to production.
Modern finance theory stresses the differential access of firms and
workers to financial markets rather than differences in preferences:
firms (shareholders) can diversify idiosyncratic risk away and so act as
risk-neutral agents in the relationship with workers, who have limited
access to financial markets. However, the assumption that firms can fully
diversify idiosyncratic risk, and therefore offer full insurance to risk-
averse workers, could be an extreme one. For one thing, empirical
studies of households’ portfolios show that investment in equities tends
to be concentrated, particularly for private equity owners.2 For another,
the optimal level of insurance may depend on the persistence of the
shocks. Gamber (1988) shows that if the provision of insurance in an
implicit contract model is constrained by the possibility of bankruptcy,
persistent shocks to performance are less likely to be insured than tem-
porary shocks. Finally, modern contract theory has emphasized the role
of unobservability of effort as an obstacle to insurance provision by the
firm, showing that the optimal level of insurance will depend on specific
characteristics of the contracting parties, such as differences in risk
aversion, the variability of performance, and other deviations from the
simple benchmark (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).
Ultimately, the amount of insurance that firms provide to their work-
ers is an empirical question. Previous empirical work has relied on ag-
1 As Knight puts it, “the system under which the confident and venturesome assume
the risk and insure the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income
in return for an assignment of the actual results . . . is the enterprise and wage system
of industry. Its existence in the world is the direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921,
269–70).
2 Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) find that U.S. households with private equity
ownership invest, on average, almost two-thirds of their private holdings in a single com-
pany in which they have an active management interest. In this case, the full-diversification
assumption clearly fails, and equity owners might well seek to shift part of the enterprise
risk onto their employees.
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gregate data to determine this. Given the role of risk diversification,
aggregate data are not the most appropriate for a convincing test of
the theory. Aggregate shocks are common to all firms and as such are
undiversifiable, regardless of technology. Besides, a positive correlation
between measures of aggregate profitability and aggregate (or even dis-
aggregated) wages may just reflect the equilibrium response of wages
to shifts in the demand for labor and have nothing to do with insurance
considerations. In addition, research so far has neglected the distinction
between less and more persistent variations in firm productivity. This
distinction is, as we shall see, empirically relevant for a correct under-
standing of the wage-profit relationship
This paper casts the wage insurance test in its correct setting: within
the firm. We rely on linked employer-employee longitudinal data with
enough information to compute measures of shocks (temporary and
permanent) both to the firm and to its employees’ wages.3 To obtain
such information, we merge company-level data for a large sample of
Italian firms with social security data available for a random sample of
their employees. Our data provide a unique opportunity to test risk
allocation between firms and workers because they enable us to isolate
the idiosyncratic shocks faced by firms and workers, which is essential to
any convincing test of the insurance hypothesis.
The basic idea behind our test is that, under full insurance, idiosyn-
cratic innovations to wages should be orthogonal to idiosyncratic in-
novations to firm performance. In other words, with full insurance,
wages should be independent of firm performance after conditioning
on predictable and common components. Under the alternative, our
test allows us to measure the amount of wage variability that is attrib-
utable to low- and high-frequency shocks to performance and to deter-
mine whether the amount of insurance offered varies with the observ-
able characteristics of the firm and of its employees.
We find that firms insure workers fully against transitory shocks but
only partially against enduring shocks. Furthermore, the amount of
insurance provided varies with worker and firm characteristics in ways
consistent with the predictions of standard models of wage insurance.
These results are robust to a number of extensions, such as accounting
for sample selection and for alternative measures of shocks.
According to our estimates, for the average worker, risk-sharing con-
siderations account for about 15 percent of the overall earnings vari-
3 The recent development of matched worker-firm data has allowed researchers to con-
trol for heterogeneity on both sides of the labor contract (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
1999). Matched data were first used to test the relation between firm performance and
wage by Bronars and Famulari (2001). They used a two-year survey of workers and firms
to look at the wage-profit relationship in the United States. But their data set is too limited
in size and duration to distinguish idiosyncratic risk from market-related risk.
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ability, most of which originates from idiosyncratic shocks to the indi-
vidual. A simple calculation of the social value of wage insurance shows
that wages are remarkably well insulated against shocks to firms. In fact,
starting from the no-insurance benchmark, we calculate that, for realistic
values of risk aversion, workers would be willing to give up about 9
percent of their wages to obtain the insurance the firm actually provides
against idiosyncratic shocks to its performance. These results have im-
portant macroeconomic implications because they indicate that firms’
compensation policy greatly reduces labor income variability, a type of
insurance hardly replicable by a market mechanism because of the usual
moral hazard problems. This, in turn, has significant effects on house-
holds’ access to credit and their decisions on such matters as savings,
portfolio allocation, and labor supply.
The paper is laid out as follows. In Section II we review the institutional
aspects of wage determination in Italy and present our data. Section III
characterizes our empirical approach, considering a stochastic specifi-
cation for firms’ performance and workers’ earnings. In Section IV we
show that in line with the wage insurance hypothesis, there exists a set
of orthogonality conditions that can be used to answer a series of em-
pirically relevant questions. In particular, one can determine whether
shocks to firms’ performance are passed on to wages, and to what extent
this depends on whether the shock is transitory or permanent. Section
V discusses the main results of the estimates, and Section VI conducts
some sensitivity analysis and extensions, insofar as several wage insurance
models hold that the degree of insurance depends on specific charac-
teristics of workers and firms. Section VII presents conclusions.
II. The Institutional Background and the Data
A. Institutional Background
Like most European countries, Italy is characterized by widespread
unionization. Although the wage insurance hypothesis examined by Aza-
riadis (1975) and others is cast in the framework of a competitive labor
market with incomplete credit and insurance markets, subsequent work
(e.g., Riddell 1981) has shown not only that implicit wage insurance
may arise in bargaining models with unions but also that unions may
play an important role in making implicit contracts feasible, since they
can mitigate the enforcement problems that typically arise (see, e.g.,
Grossman and Hart 1981; Malcomson 1983). However, if wages were set
through a highly centralized bargaining process, there could be little
room left for them to react to firm-specific shocks, and this would ham-
per our empirical strategy for testing the wage insurance model. In fact,
Italian industrial relations are based on multitier collective bargaining,
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with economywide, industrywide, and company-level agreements. The
latter, as we illustrate below, provide sufficient room for wages potentially
to respond to idiosyncratic shocks.
Collective contracts signed by the three major trade unions (CGIL,
CISL, and UIL) have erga omnes validity; that is, they apply to all workers
covered by the agreement regardless of union membership. Econo-
mywide bargaining deals mainly with general employment regulations,
such as safety and employment protection. The relevant tiers for wage
formation are at the industry and company levels. Agreements at the
industry level were signed every three years during the period covered
by our data, establishing the contractual minimums for the various job
grades. Supplementary components of the compensation package are
determined at the company level, where the firm can decide on some
components of the compensation unilaterally and can also agree to a
company contract with the unions, covering both wage and nonwage
matters. Firm-level contracts are not obligatory, and there is no standard
rule governing their duration.
The relevance of the firm to wage determination has been evolving
with industrial relations.4 Our data cover the years from 1982 to 1994,
when there was a fairly high degree of bargaining decentralization.5 For
this period, the wage bill can be decomposed into the following com-
ponents:6
1. contractual minimums (minimi tabellari), established at the industry
level;
2. cost-of-living allowance (indennita` di contingenza), added to the con-
tractual minimum according to the inflation rate;
4 Until the 1960s, company-level bargaining was not formally recognized. The economic
boom encouraged the rise of company-level bargaining, at that time mainly focusing on
wages and productivity and essentially autonomous vis-a`-vis industrywide agreements. The
1970s saw the greatest development of company-level agreements. Starting toward the end
of that decade, the worsening economic crisis and the unions’ concern over unemployment
led to a gradual reshaping of company-level bargaining. A major restructuring of the
industrial relations system came in 1993, following devaluation and the severe recession
that ensued. Given that our data cover only up to 1994, the 1993 agreement plays essentially
no role, and the industrial relations regime we have to consider is the relatively autonomous
one in effect previously.
5 Iversen (1998) constructs an index of centralization of wage bargaining that combines
a measure of union concentration with a measure of the prevalent level of bargaining.
The index covers 15 OECD countries from 1973 to 1995. He divides his sample into three
groups: centralized (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Finland), intermediately
centralized (Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Japan, and Switzerland), and decentralized
(Italy, United Kingdom, France, United States, and Canada), ranked in order of degree
of centralization. The index ranges from 0.071 (United States and Canada) to 0.538
(Norway), with Italy having a value of 0.179. For comparison, the United Kingdom has a
value of 0.177, France 0.121, and Switzerland 0.25.
6 See Erickson and Ichino (1995) for further details on wage formation in Italy for the
period covered by our data.
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3. company-level wage increment (superminimum), added to the con-
tractual minimum on a permanent basis (in nominal terms); the
increment has a firm-level and a worker-level component;
4. production bonuses (premi di produzione), determined at the firm
level: these are bonuses and other one-time payments, decided uni-
laterally by the firm without formal negotiations with the trade
unions; they are not permanent;
5. variable compensation (retribuzione variabile), determined by a firm-
level contract; it can introduce a contingent component in the com-
pensation package.
The importance of firm-specific wage effects depends on the diffusion
of company-level bargaining and on the magnitude of the firm-specific
wage components. In terms of diffusion of firm-level contracts, the yearly
report of CESOS, an association of trade unions, indicates that ap-
proximately half of Italian workers were involved in firm-level contract
negotiations each year from 1984 to 1994.7 The likelihood of firm-level
contracts increases with firm size (Bellardi and Bordogna 1997). As we
shall see, in our sample, large firms are disproportionately represented,
implying a greater importance of firm-level contracts than for the av-
erage firm.
A breakdown of the wage bill into its various components is not avail-
able for the economy as a whole. The data set that is most extensively
used to address this issue uses wage formation data in the metal prod-
ucts, machinery, and equipment industry assembled by Federmeccanica,
the association of employers for that sector. Though a partial view with
respect to our analysis and data, which encompass all the private sectors,
these data provide insights that are likely to extend to the economy as
a whole because the patterns are induced by quite general institutional
features (Rossi and Sestito 2000). Table 1 gives the breakdown of the
average wage into the five components discussed above for 1984–94
(approximately the same as our data, which cover the years 1982–94).
The industrywide component of the wage declined from 84 percent in
1984 to 77 percent in 1994. This means that between one-sixth and one-
quarter of the compensation was firm-specific, with quantitatively im-
portant scope for firms to influence the wages of their employees over
and above industry-level bargaining.
Taken together, then, the institutional setting and the wage formation
process indicate that an important component of the compensation of
7 The 1994 Bank of Italy survey on manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees found
that more than 92 percent of these workers were covered by a firm-level contract in addition
to the industrywide agreement and that 40 percent had been involved in a contractual
round during the year (information on previous years is not available).
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TABLE 1

























1984 32.4 51.9 84.3 13.0 2.7 .0 15.7
1985 32.1 51.2 83.3 14.2 2.5 .0 16.7
1986 30.1 51.3 81.4 15.5 3.1 .0 18.6
1987 31.2 50.0 81.2 15.8 3.0 .0 18.8
1988 30.4 47.5 77.9 17.3 3.1 1.7 22.1
1989 29.5 47.8 77.3 16.8 3.4 2.5 22.7
1990 28.1 48.3 76.4 17.9 3.3 2.4 23.6
1991 30.3 48.0 78.3 16.6 3.0 2.1 21.7
1992 31.0 46.8 77.8 17.2 3.0 2.0 22.2
1993 32.7 45.2 77.9 17.3 3.0 1.8 22.1
1994 32.5 44.6 77.1 18.2 2.9 1.8 22.9
Source.—Federmeccanica, the association of employers for the metal products, machinery, and equipment sector.
Note.—Each entry represents the percentage contribution to the wage bill. Col. 1 is the contractual minimum; col.
2 is the indexation component; and col. 3 is the sum of the cols. 1 and 2, which constitutes the industrywide component
of the wage. The remaining columns represent the firm-level components: the superminimum (col. 4) is the wage
premium above the contractual minimum, the production bonuses (col. 5) are bonuses and other one-time payments,
the variable component (col. 6) is determined by firm-level contracts, and col. 7 is the sum of the firm-level components.
employees is determined at the level of the firm. This begs the question
of how much the firm insures its employees against firm-specific shocks.
B. The Data
We rely on two administrative data sets, one for firms and one for work-
ers. Data for firms are obtained from the Company Accounts Data Ser-
vice (Centrale dei Bilanci [CB]), and those on workers are supplied by
the National Institute for Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della Pre-
videnza Sociale [INPS]). Since for each worker we can identify the firm,
we combine the two data sets and use them in a matched employer-
employee framework.8
The CB data span from 1982 to 1994, which comprises two complete
business cycles, and give detailed information on a large number of
balance sheet items together with a full description of firm charac-
teristics (location, year of foundation, sector, and ownership struc-
ture), plus other variables of economic interest usually not included
in balance sheets, such as employment and flow of funds. Company
accounts are collected for approximately 30,000 firms per year by the
service, which was established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank
of Italy, the Italian Banking Association, and a pool of leading banks
to gather and share information on borrowers. Since the banks rely
heavily on it in granting and pricing loans, the data are subject to
8 There is a burgeoning empirical literature on the use of matched employer-employee
data sets (see Hamermesh [1999] for an account).
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extensive quality controls by a pool of professionals, so measurement
error should be negligible. While the CB data are reasonably repre-
sentative of the entire population in terms of distribution by sector
and geographical area (Guiso and Schivardi 1999), the focus on level
of borrowing skews the sample toward larger firms: CB reporting firms
account for approximately half of total employment and 7 percent of
the number of firms in manufacturing.
The INPS provides us with data for the entire population of workers
registered with the social security system whose birthday falls on one of
two randomly chosen days of the year. Data are available on a continuous
basis from 1974 to 1994. We use the data after 1981 for consistency with
the timing of the CB data. The INPS data do not cover self-employment
or public employment (public firms are also absent from the CB). The
INPS data set derives from employer forms roughly comparable to those
collected by the Social Security Administration in the United States.9
Misreporting is prosecuted.
Both the INPS and the CB data include the employer’s tax code, so
matching employers with the employees is straightforward. Like other
countries’ social security data, the Italian INPS data contain detailed
information on worker compensation, but information on demograph-
ics is scant.
Table 2 reports various descriptive statistics for the firms (panel A)
and workers (panel B) using 1991 as an example. We report separate
statistics for the whole sample (before matching) and for the sample
obtained after matching. From an initial sample of 177,654 firm/year
observations, we end up with 122,860, corresponding to 17,272 firms.
We exclude firms with intermittent participation (40,225 observations)
and those with missing values on the variables used to construct the test
(14,569 observations). Since the panel is unbalanced, the firms in this
sample may appear from one to 13 years.
The firms range from very small to a workforce of 180,000, the mean
staff size is 194, and the median is 60. Most of the firms are in the North
(74 percent). Manufacturing accounts for about 75 percent of the final
sample and construction for 15 percent, whereas the remaining 10 per-
cent is scattered in the retail and other service sectors. On the average,
firms in the matched sample are larger, but their distribution by region
and industry is similar to that of the whole sample.
Panel B reports sample characteristics for the workers in the 1982–
9 While the U.S. administrative data are usually provided on a grouped basis, the INPS
has truly individual records. Moreover, U.S. earnings records are censored at the top of
the tax bracket, whereas the Italian data set is not subject to top coding.
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TABLE 2











Value added 8.27 16.14 123.02 156.56
Number of employees 194 381 2,281 3,526
South .0917 .1089 .2887 .3115
Center .1643 .1686 .3706 .3744
North .7439 .7226 .4365 .4478
Manufacturing .7722 .8052 .4194 .3961
Construction .1573 .1231 .3641 .3287
Retail trade .0257 .0230 .1582 .1499
Services .0447 .0486 .2068 .2151
B. Worker Characteristics
Earnings 13,363 13,929 6,004 6,189
Age 40.83 42.33 9.69 9.01
Male .7454 .7657 .4357 .4236
Production workers .6275 .6362 .4835 .4812
Clerical workers .3556 .3452 .4787 .4755
Managers .0169 .0186 .1289 .1352
South .1446 .1113 .3517 .3146
Center .1837 .1845 .3872 .3879
North .6717 .7042 .4696 .4565
Manufacturing .7290 .8197 .4445 .3845
Construction .1161 .0911 .3203 .2878
Retail trade .0849 .0408 .2787 .1978
Services .0700 .0485 .2552 .2147
Note.—Panel A reports summary statistics for the firms in our data set. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the
sample of workers. All statistics refer to 1991. For firms, the “whole sample” is the full CB sample. For workers, it is the
largest sample for which information on industry and location can be recovered by merging the worker sample with
the firm sample. This sample is larger than the “matched sample” because time-invariant firm characteristics can be
extended to years in which we do not directly observe the firm but, through its fiscal identifier, we can infer that the
worker was employed by such firm. The matched data set includes only observations for which we have contemporaneous
observations on both the worker and the firm. Value added is in millions of euros and earnings in euros. All the other
variables, with the exception of age, are indicator variables.
94 INPS sample.10 We start with an initial sample of 267,539 worker/
year observations (including multiple observations in a year when work-
ers change positions within firms or change firms, or when employers
change, etc.) and end up with 130,785, corresponding to 23,788 indi-
viduals.11 Since the focus is wage insurance, our sample selection is made
with the explicit aim of retaining workers with stable employment and
10 The INPS data do not report workers’ sector of activity and location. This information
can be recovered only after matching workers with firms. The “whole sample” of panel B
is the largest sample for which a match is obtained and this information recovered. This
sample, which we use to estimate the earnings equation, is larger than the “matched
sample” because time-invariant firm characteristics (such as sector of activity and location)
can be extended to years in which we do not directly observe the firm but, through its
fiscal identifier, can infer that the worker was employed by such firm.
11 Additional observations are lost (for both firms and workers) in the empirical analysis
given the dynamic nature of most of our estimators.
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tenure patterns. First, we excluded workers younger than 18 or older
than 65 (2,652 observations), circumventing the problem of modeling
human capital accumulation and retirement decisions. To avoid dealing
with wage changes that are due to job termination (quits or dismissals)
or unstable employment patterns, we excluded part-time workers, those
changing position during the year or with multiple jobs (81,117 obser-
vations), and those who worked for less than 12 months (43,750 ob-
servations). In this way we isolate the on-the-job aspect of the wage
insurance contract, leaving consideration of changes in occupational
status to future studies. Moreover, we keep only individuals with nonzero
recorded earnings in all years (105 observations lost) and eliminate
some outliers (503 observations).12 Finally, we eliminate those with miss-
ing values on the variables used in the empirical analysis (8,627 obser-
vations). Since these selections—particularly those that exclude job and
firm changes—could affect the results, we check the robustness of our
findings when retaining these observations (see Sec. VI.A).
Our measure of earnings covers regular and overtime pay plus non-
wage compensation. We deflate earnings using the consumer price in-
dex (1991 prices). For workers with intermittent participation, we treat
two strings of successive observations separated in time as though they
pertained to two different individuals.
Workers in the whole sample are, on average, 41 years old in 1991;
production workers account for 63 percent of the sample, clerical for
36 percent, and managers for about 2 percent. Men make up 75 percent
of our sample and residents in the South 15 percent. Finally, average
net earnings in 1991 are roughly i13,000. In the matched final sample,
the individual characteristics are similar. We end up with 45,446 matched
observations, pertaining to 9,203 workers and 4,691 firms. By design,
the number of matches per firm increases with firm size. On average,
a firm is matched with 1.54 workers in any given year (with a minimum
of one and a maximum of 63 matches).
III. Modeling Firms’ Performance and Workers’ Earnings
Our testing strategy is based on the theory-grounded idea that if firms
fully insure their workers against diversifiable risk, idiosyncratic inno-
vations to wages should be orthogonal to idiosyncratic changes in firm
performance. To construct the orthogonality test, we need a measure
of idiosyncratic shocks to performance and to wages. We also need to
separate the dynamics of the idiosyncratic shocks to performance into
12 An observation is classified as an outlier if (a) real earnings are under i500, (b) they
are below i3,000 and the change in log real earnings is less than negative two, or (c) they
exceed i50,000 and the change in log real earnings is greater than two.
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transitory and permanent shocks in order to analyze whether insurance
depends on the persistence of firm performance. In the sections that
follow, we provide a statistical characterization of these processes that
allows us to net out all the predictable and aggregate components, thus
obtaining an estimate of the idiosyncratic innovations.
Before we move into details, it is useful to contrast our approach with
previous empirical work. Papers belonging to one strand in the literature
regress individual wages on measures of aggregate profits. Blanchflower,
Oswald, and Sanfey (1996) and Esteva˜o and Tevlin (2003) use U.S.
industrywide profits drawn from the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search productivity database, and Christofides and Oswald (1992) use
Canadian data of similar form. Given the role of risk diversification,
however, the use of aggregate profits cannot provide a convincing test
of the theory. Aggregate profits reflect economywide shocks that are
uninsurable by definition. Besides, a positive correlation between mea-
sures of aggregate profitability and individual wages may just reflect the
equilibrium response of wages to shifts in the demand for labor, with
no bearing on insurance considerations.
Another strand of research relies on firm-specific data. Currie and
McConnell (1992) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993) use labor union
contracts and regress collectively bargained wages on firm-specific prof-
its. Bargained wages, however, exclude bonuses and other components
of pay that make up an important part of wage variability. In the Italian
case, the institutional features discussed in the previous section would
make collectively bargained wages orthogonal to firm-specific profits
even if the firm provides no insurance to workers against firm-specific
fluctuations in productivity. A final set of contributions is by Nickell and
Wadhwani (1991) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997), who regress firm-
specific average wages on firm profitability. While this is a step toward
a more disaggregated approach, measures of wages at the firm level do
not control fully for individual workers’ characteristics. For example,
changes in wages might be related to changes in profits because both
reflect a change in the composition of the firm’s workforce rather than
risk sharing.
Finally, it is worth stressing that none of the papers reviewed here
looks at the separate effect of permanent and transitory shocks to the
firm’s performance on the extent of risk sharing between the firm and
its workers.13 The distinction between less and more persistent shocks
is, as we shall see, empirically crucial for a correct understanding of the
wage–firm performance relationship.
13 The article by Gamber (1988) is an exception, but his test uses industry-level data
and as such is subject to the criticisms given in the text.
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A. Firms’ Performance
Our measure of firm performance is value added, that is, the volume
of contractible output that remains once intermediate inputs have been
remunerated (i.e., the sum of pretax profits, wages, and perks). We
prefer value added to profits for two reasons. First, value added is the
variable that is directly subject to stochastic fluctuations. Second, firms
have discretionary power over the reporting of profits in balance sheets,
which makes profits a less reliable objective gauge.
Our aim is to isolate changes in firm performance. To do so, we model
firm performance according to the following process:
′(1 rL)y p Z g f  e , (1)jt jt j jt
where j and t are subscripts for the jth firm at time t; is the logarithmyjt
of value added at 1991 prices, deflated by the producer price index; L
is the lag operator; is a vector of strictly exogenous firm charac-Z jt
teristics; is a firm fixed effect; and is the shock against which thef ej jt
amount of insurance provided by the firm will be determined. We in-
clude the first lag of value added to capture predictable dynamics (e.g.,
precommitted sales). The role of is to control for nonidiosyncraticZ jt
(i.e., aggregate, location, and industry-specific) shocks.14
Taking the first difference of (1) eliminates the fixed effect and
produces
′(1 rL)Dy p DZ g De . (2)jt jt jt
Since ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are inconsistent because
of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, we use the
two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) approach of Arellano
and Bond (1991). If were serially uncorrelated, consistent estimatesejt
could be obtained using lags of y dated and earlier as instruments.t 2
This hypothesis can be tested using the test of serial correlation of the
residuals derived by Arellano and Bond. The test statistic is standard
normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
The standard test of overidentifying restrictions ( J-test) provides further
corroboration of the validity of the specification. Under the null hy-
pothesis that the model is correctly specified, the J-statistic is asymptot-
ically distributed with as many degrees of freedom as overidentifying2x
restrictions and is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Low
values of the statistic (high p-values of the test) will signal that the model
is correctly specified. In our case, both the test of no serial correlation
and the test of overidentifying restrictions reject the hypothesis that
14 In Sec. VI.B, we show that the results are robust to an expanded definition of the
vector Z, which includes the firm’s capital stock and labor input, while also accounting
for their endogeneity.













Overidentifying restriction test 59.49
[.2830]
Observations 90,659
Note.—The table reports the results of a GMM regression for value-added growth at time
t. Instruments are constructed using the GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) and
include the log of value added dated and earlier. For year and sector dummies, F-statisticst 3
are reported; values in brackets are p-values.
TABLE 4
Autocovariance Structure of Shocks to
Value Added











Note.—The table reports the estimates and the corresponding
standard errors of the autocovariances at various orders of the
residual of value-added growth in first differences, i.e., estimates
of . The data are pooled over all years.E(De De )jt jtt
is serially uncorrelated (with p-values of 0.1 percent and 1 percent,ejt
respectively). We thus instrument using all the available lags of yDyjt1
dated and earlier. The results of the GMM regression (using allt 3
firms in the sample, not just those matched) are reported in table 3.
The overidentifying restriction test using these instruments no longer
indicates misspecification. Our estimate of r is 0.48 with a standard error
of 0.03, and region, year, and industry dummies are jointly statistically
significant.
We next construct the residual from (2), a consistent estimate of
. The estimated autocovariances , reported in table 4,De E(De De )jt jt jtt
show that there is no large or statistically significant correlation at lags
greater than two, confirming our choice of instruments in table 3.
The autocovariances of can now be analyzed to gain knowledgeDejt
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about the dynamic structure of the shocks. This is an important step in
the analysis because different dynamic structures will imply different
characterizations of the wage determination process. The dynamics of
depends on (a) the number of its variance components and (b) theDejt
separate dynamics of these components. In terms of the latter, exami-
nation of the autocovariances at various lags immediately rules out the
presence of an autoregressive component, which would have implied a
smooth decline, so that autocovariances would not drop to zero as rap-
idly as they do. As far as the number of components is concerned, the
autocovariance structure of is consistent with a single variance com-Dejt
ponent following an MA(2) process. The problem with this represen-
tation is that it constrains all shocks to have the same dynamic influence
on value added.15 Most processes, however, contain several shock com-
ponents of both a stationary and nonstationary nature. This seems par-
ticularly important when modeling firms’ performance; in fact, firms
are likely to experience both transitory shocks (such as temporary
changes in demand and machine breakdowns) and permanent shocks
(such as persistent demand and technological changes). An alternative
representation of the process for that accommodates this fact and isejt
also consistent with the autocovariance structure of from table 4 isDejt
˜e p z  (1 vL)v (3)jt jt jt
and
˜z p z  u , (4)jt jt1 jt
where is now decomposed into the sum of a random walk and anejt
MA(1) component. We assume covariance stationarity of the distur-
bances and for all t, no serial correlation2 2 2 2˜ ˜E(u )p j E(v )p j
˜ ˜jt u jt v
for , and no cross correlation˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜E(v v )p E(u u )p 0 s( t E(v u )p 0js jt js jt js jt
for all s, t. By taking first differences of (3) and using (4), we obtain
˜ ˜De p u  (1 vL)Dv . (5)jt jt jt
This process is consistent with the autocovariance structure of Dejt
in table 4 because it implies that for andE(De De )( 0 FtF ≤ 2jt jtt
for .E(De De )p 0 FtF 1 2jt jtt
Obviously, since even in the absence of a random walkDe ∼ MA(2)jt
in the levels, the consistency of (5) with the results in table 4 is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to conclude that there is a random
15 For example, suppose that . Integrating, we getDe p h  f h  f hjt jt 1 jt1 2 jt2

e p h  (1 f )h  (1 f  f ) h .jt jt 1 jt1 1 2 jtk
kp2
Given that , all shocks have permanent effects unlesslim (e /h )p 1 f  f f kr jtk jt 1 2 1
, in which case they all have only temporary effects.f p 12
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walk component in the levels. However, one can distinguish between
the null and the alternative˜ ˜ ˜De p (1 vL)Dv De p (1 vL)Dv  ujt jt jt jt jt
by noting that under the null , whereas under2E[De ( De )]p 0jt jtttp2
the alternative (see Meghir and Pistaferri2 2E[De ( De )]p j
˜jt jtt utp2
2004). If we perform this test using the residuals , the null hypothesisDejt
is rejected quite overwhelmingly (a p-value of less than 0.01 percent),
so we conclude in favor of the existence of a non-mean-reverting random
walk component in addition to a mean-reverting MA(1) component, as
is implied by our characterization of the shocks to firm performance.
This characterization has the advantage of allowing for shocks of dif-
ferent persistence, while keeping the dynamic structure of as simpleDejt
as possible.16
On the basis of this representation, equation (1) can be inverted and
value added rewritten as the sum of a deterministic , a permanentDjt
, and a transitory component :P Tjt jt
y p D  P  T , (6)jt jt jt jt
where and . One can1 ′ 1D p (1 rL) (Z g f ) P  T p (1 rL) ejt jt j jt jt jt
show that and171P p (1 r) zjt jt
1 1
˜ ˜T p (1 rL) [(1 vL)v  (1 r) ru ].jt jt jt
Taking first differences and premultiplying by , we can equiva-1 rL
lently write equation (2) as
′(1 rL)Dy p DZ g (1 rL)u  Dv , (7)jt jt jt jt
where
1
˜u p u (8)jt jt1 r
and
r
˜ ˜v p (1 vL)v  u (9)jt jt jt1 r
are the innovations to the permanent and transitory components of
16 Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that firms are able to distinguish between
temporary and permanent shocks. This is not unreasonable since firms that, say, syste-
matically confuse permanent demand increases for their product for temporary ones will
not survive long in a competitive environment and therefore have strong incentives to
detect the type of shock they face.
17 This derivation uses the fact that and are cointegrated I(1) and that their coin-y zjt jt
tegration vector is , so that the linear combination is I(0).1 ′ 1[1 (1 r) ] y  (1 r) zjt jt
The two components and can be found by simple application of the Granger rep-P Tjt jt
resentation theorem. We make no attempt at orthogonalizing and because we identifyP Tjt jt
their separate effect on wages in the unorthogonalized case.
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value added, respectively.18 Note that and are mutually correlatedu vjt jt
and that is serially correlated.19vjt
B. Workers’ Earnings
We assume that workers’ pay can be described by the following equation:
′w p X d aP  bT  h  w , (10)ijt ijt jt jt i ijt
where the subscript i stands for the ith individual; is the logarithmwijt
of worker compensation;20 and denotes a vector of systematic factorsX ijt
that affect individual i’s compensation, which can vary across workers,
firms, and time (including in [6]). Among other things, includesD Xjt ijt
region, occupation, industry, and year dummies. These dummies re-
move any variation in wages due to industrywide and national bargaining
(including wage indexation). We let wages depend on the permanent
and the transitory components of firm performance through loading
factors a and b, respectively. This formulation allows for different levels
of insurance against shocks of different persistence, a hypothesis that
is testable. We also include workers’ fixed effects . Finally, is theh wi ijt
stochastic component of earnings unrelated to the firm’s fortunes.
These idiosyncratic shocks are meant to capture the unobservable
component of one’s outside wage (individual ability and fluctuations
thereof), as well as idiosyncratic changes in labor supply (e.g., prolonged
illness, child raising, and family labor supply effects).
Taking first differences to eliminate fixed effects and multiplying by
gives1 rL
′(1 rL)Dw p (1 rL)DX d a(1 rL)u  bDvijt ijt jt jt
 (1 rL)Dwijt
′p (1 rL)DX d Dq . (11)ijt ijt
Since we have a lagged endogenous variable, (11) must also be estimated
18 By the definition of permanent and transitory components, the innovation toujt
is such that , whereas the innovation to is such thatP lim (y /u )( 0 v Tjt kr jtk jt jt jt
.lim (y /v )p 0kr jtk jt
19 In particular, and . Note also that2 2 2 2 2 2j p rj /(1 r) j p vj j p j /(1 r)
˜ ˜ ˜uv u vv v u u1
and that . Estimation of the primitive parameters r, v,2 2 2 2 2j p (1 v )j  [r/(1 r)] j
˜ ˜v v u
, and allows us to recover the variances of the innovations and , as well as the2 2 2 2j j j j
˜ ˜u v u v
covariances and .j juv vv1
20 We let earnings depend on contemporaneous shocks to firm performance; i.e., we
assume that wages adjust immediately to changes in performance. In practice, wages might
adjust with a lag (think of bonus decisions, which are usually made at the end of the
calendar year). Nevertheless, if adjustments are made at a frequency higher than the year
(say, quarterly), annual data of the type used here will not detect deviations from the
contemporaneous adjustment assumption.
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by an instrumental variables procedure.21 The selection of instruments
depends on the extent of serial correlation in . By reasoning anal-Dqijt
ogous to that of the previous subsection, we find that a representation
of that is consistent with the data iswijt
w p c  (1 lL)y (12)ijt ijt ijt
and
c p c  m , (13)ijt ijt1 ijt
that is, a permanent plus transitory MA(1) decomposition. Equations
(12) and (13) thus imply that is an MA(3) process. Lagged instru-Dqijt
ments must be selected accordingly. The first step is to regress onDwijt
and on the exogenous characteristics to estimate r and d.Dwijt1
Our measure of earnings is the log of annual net real earnings. We
control for a set of observable individual attributes: a quadratic in age,
education (here proxied by a set of occupation dummies), gender, re-
gion dummies, sector dummies, and time dummies. Nominal gross earn-
ings are first transformed into nominal earnings net of taxes and social
security contributions (using the rules coded in the Italian tax system
at each point in time) and then deflated by the consumer price index
to 1991 prices. We estimate the earnings growth equation by GMM using
all the available lags of w dated and earlier and rely on data fort 4
all workers in the whole sample rather than just those in the matched
sample.
The results are reported in table 5. The autoregressive coefficient is
0.44 (with a standard error of 0.06), essentially the same as in the firm
regression case (a null that is not formally rejected). Earnings growth
is higher for men and managers, and increases with age at a declining
rate. Year, region, and industry dummies are jointly significant. The
overidentifying restrictions test does not signal general misspecification.
We use the residual of this regression to construct a consistent estimate
of . We calculate the autocovariances of , pooling over all years,Dq Dqijt ijt
and report the results in table 6. Examination of the estimated auto-
covariances of the residual component of the rate of growth of earnings
reveals that they decline very rapidly after the first order: on average,
the autocovariance of order 0 is 0.016, that of order 1, 0.007, and that
of order 2, 0.00042.22 However, they are still statistically different from
21 Under our hypothesis, the length of the autoregressive process for firm performance
carries over to workers’ earnings (with the same coefficient if the autoregressive com-
ponent of wages is exclusively driven by risk-shifting considerations).
22 These are lower than the estimates for the United States using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (Meghir and Pistaferri 2004) and those for Italy using the 1995 Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) (Pistaferri 2001), perhaps reflecting the fact
that measurement error is less of a problem in this data set.










Production workers .0165 .0032












Note.—The table reports the results of a GMM regression for earnings growth at time
t. Instruments are constructed using the GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991)
and include the log of earnings dated and earlier. For year and sector dummiest 4
F-statistics are reported; values in brackets are p-values.
TABLE 6
Autocovariance Structure of Shocks to
Earnings











Note.—The table reports the estimates and the corresponding
standard errors of the autocovariances of the unexplained com-
ponent of real earnings growth, i.e., estimates of .E(Dq Dq )ijt ijtt
Data are pooled over all years.
zero until lag 4, which has a borderline p-value of 9 percent. This is
again broadly consistent with our choice of instruments. These auto-
covariances (and, especially, the cross covariances ) are fur-E[Dq De ]ijt js
ther structured in the next section.
IV. Wage Insurance: Identification
Our strategy is to test for insurance within the firm by looking at the
relationship between the residual component of individual wage growth,
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, and the two components, transitory and permanent, of the idio-Dqijt
syncratic shocks to firm performance, . From equation (11), hasDe Dqjt ijt
the following representation:
Dq p a(1 rL)u  bDv  (1 rL)Dw . (14)ijt jt jt ijt
We assume that for all s, t. Equation (14)E(w u )p E(w v )p 0ijs jt ijs jt
allows for different reactions to temporary and permanent shocks to
performance. In this way, the estimates of equation (14) allow for various
insurance regimes. If workers share part of the fluctuations in firm
performance without distinguishing between transitory and enduring
shocks, ; we call this case “homogeneous partial insurance.”0 ! ap b
The insurance regime may result in a different reaction to shocks of a
different nature. For instance, workers may bear a substantial portion
of the permanent shocks but a small portion of transitory shocks; we
call this “heterogeneous partial insurance”: , , and . Twoa( b a 1 0 b 1 0
special cases occur when workers bear only transitory shocks and are
insulated from permanent shocks (“permanent full insurance”: ap 0
and ) or bear permanent shocks but are insured against transitoryb 1 0
ones (“transitory full insurance”: and ). Finally, workersbp 0 a 1 0
might be completely sheltered from shocks, temporary and permanent
alike (“full insurance”: ).23ap bp 0
Clearly, full insurance implies that the contemporaneous covariance
between shocks to performance and to wage growth, , is zero.E(De Dq )jt ijt
This simple case aside, identification of the parameters is far from trivial.
In fact, equation (14) contains the contribution of two unobservable
components, and . Recall that, from the estimation of (2), weu Dvjt jt
obtain a consistent estimate of , so that only theDe p (1 rL)u  Dvjt jt jt
sum of and is observed. Without further restrictions, from(1 rL)u Dvjt jt
equation (14) we cannot separately identify a and b.
To see how identification of the relevant parameters is achieved, sub-
tract from both sides of (14) to obtainbDejt
Dq  bDe p (a b)(1 rL)u  (1 rL)Dw . (15)ijt jt jt ijt
Multiply both sides by and take expectations to yield the ortho-Dejt1
gonality condition
E[De (Dq  bDe )]p 0, (16)jt1 ijt jt
which follows from the fact that, from (8) and (9), ˜De p u jt1 jt1
23 An interesting extension would be to allow for an asymmetric response of wages to
positive and negative transitory and permanent shocks. For instance, one could imagine
workers to be insured against downside risk but still take part of the upside movements
in value added. Clearly, models that allow for such asymmetric effects are not identifiable.
The reason is that we do not separately observe transitory and permanent shocks; it is
only (a consistent estimate of) their convolution ( ) that is observable.Dejt
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(with and mutually and serially uncorrelated);˜ ˜ ˜(1 vL)Dv u vjt1 jt1 jt1
hence, is orthogonal to the right-hand side of (15). Intuitively,Dejt1
equation (16) tells us that once one filters the unexplained component
of earnings growth by the unexplained component of value-addedDqijt
growth (weighted by a factor b, the extent to which wages move inDejt
response to changes in the transitory component of value added), what
remains is uncorrelated with the future unexplained component of
value-added growth. In an OLS regression of on , the latter isDq Deijt jt
endogenous because it is correlated with the right-hand side of equation
(15) via .24 However, (and, more generally, any power ku De [De ]jt jt1 jt1
with ) is a valid instrument because it is correlated withk ≥ 1 Dejt
( ) and uncorrelated with the error term (the2 2E[De De ]p [1 v] j
˜jt jt1 v
right-hand side of [15]). Equation (16) can be used to identify the first
parameter of interest, b.
Identification of a is achieved using a similar strategy and amounts
to exploiting the orthogonality condition
2
E De (Dq  aDe ) p 0, (17)( )jtt ijt jt[ ]
tp2
which identifies a under covariance stationarity.25 In practice, all in-
struments of the form (for ) are valid under this2 m( De ) m ≥ 1jtttp2
assumption.26
The foregoing is a discussion of the identification of the two insurance
parameters a and b. To close the circle on identification, we need to
identify the variances of the shock to value-added growth ( and )2 2j ju v
and the moving average coefficient v, and the variances of the idiosyn-
cratic component of earnings growth ( and ) and the moving av-2 2j jm y
erage parameter l. In practice, we start by estimating firm-level param-
eters using minimum distance (Chamberlain 1984). We do this by
choosing the parameters that minimize the distance between the actual
moments and the moments predicted by the restrictions (3) and (4).
24 It is worth noting that OLS estimation provides unbiased and consistent estimation
if . Thus an exogeneity (Wu-Hausman) test for can implicitly check whetherap b Dejt
.ap b
25 If covariance stationarity is violated, one can prove that (if , a result consistentb r 0
with our empirical analysis)
ar qt
ˆp lim (a a)p ,
1 r1 qt
where is the growth of . The hypothesis of covariance stationarity for ,˜ ˜q Var (u ) Var (u )t jt jt
which we estimate with the sample analogue of , is not rejected (p-2E[( De )De ]jtt jttp2
value of 71 percent).
26 The second and third powers of the instruments, for instance, are valid as long as
the third and fourth moments of and , respectively, are nonzero. See Cragg (1997)˜ ˜u vjt jt
for a discussion.
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From the autocovariance function of workers’ earnings, we can estimate,
again by minimum distance, the variance of the transitory and per-
manent idiosyncratic shocks to wages ( and , respectively) and the2 2j jy m
moving average parameter l using the restrictions imposed by (12),
(13), and (14).
V. Results
We apply the identification strategy outlined in the previous section to
estimate the parameters of interest, a (the sensitivity of earnings to the
permanent component of value added) and b (sensitivity to the tran-
sitory component). In both cases, our estimating equation consists of
an instrumental variables regression of onto .Dq Deijt jt
As explained in the previous section, b is identified using ask(De )jt1
an instrument and a using . We use the first three powers2 k( De )jtttp2
of the instruments. This gives us two overidentifying restrictions for each
equation. These are tested with a standard J-statistic (generalized Sargan
test). The power of the instruments in the reduced-form regressions is
checked by looking at the p-value of the F-test on the excluded instru-
ments. Finally, an exogeneity (Wu-Hausman) test for (Davidson andDejt
MacKinnon 1993) is an implicit test for .ap b
We also comment on the estimates of the variances of transitory and
permanent shocks to value added and of idiosyncratic transitory and
permanent shocks to wages. Finally, we construct an estimate of the
ratio between the standard deviation of wage growth due to the firm-
related components and the total standard deviation of wage growth,
, which tells approximately how much wage2 2 E{[(Dq ) ]Fj }/ E[(Dq ) ]ijt ijt
variability is due to workers sharing the firm’s fortunes.27 This turns out
to be a useful way to summarize the evidence.
Table 7 shows the results. From panel A, we see that workers’ wages
do reflect current shocks to value added: with aE(Dq De )p 0.0021ijt jt
standard error of 0.0003. Thus from the outset we reject full insurance.
The estimate of is much smaller and statistically insignif-E(Dq De )ijt jt1
icant. For purposes of comparison, the same panel also reports the
estimated value of the relevant moments of the shocks to output and
wages, which are very close to those estimated for the full sample (see
tables 4 and 6).28
Panel B reports estimates of a and b along with a variety of diagnostic
27 The variance of wage growth due to the firm-related components, , is2E {[(Dq ) ]Fj }ijt
given by
2 2 2 2E {[(Dq ) ]Fj }p a[a(1 r )j  b(1 r)j ] b[a(1 r)j  2b(j  j )].ijt u uv uv v vv1
28 For example, is 0.0155 in the matched final sample and 0.0163 in the fullE(Dq Dq )ijt ijt
sample; is 0.0070 in the matched final sample and 0.0071 in the fullE(Dq Dq )ijt ijt1
sample.
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TABLE 7








E(Dq Dq )ijt ijt .0155
(.0006)
E(De De )jt jt .0978
(.0083)
E(Dq De )ijt jt .0021
(.0003)
E(Dq Dq )ijt ijt1 .0070
(.0004)
E(De De )jt jt1 .0453
(.0055)
E(Dq De )ijt jt1 .0003
(.0002)










J-test (p-value) .5794 .4616
























Note.—In panel A, is an estimate of the autocovariance of wage growth shocks of order t,E(Dq Dq )ijt ijtt
an estimate of the autocovariance of value-added growth shocks of order t, and an estimateE(De De ) E(Dq De )jt jtt ijt jtt
of the cross covariance of wage and value-added growth shocks of order t. Panel B reports the instrumental variables
estimates of the sensitivity of wages to value-added shocks (a for permanent shocks and b for transitory shocks). See
the text for more details on the instruments used in each regression. The J-test is the test of overidentifying restrictions.
The F-test is the test of joint insignificance of excluded instruments. The exogeneity test tests the null that in an OLS
regression of on , the latter is exogenous. Panel C reports EWMD estimates of the variance components ,2Dq De j
˜ijt jt u
, , and (the variances of value-added permanent shocks, value-added transitory shocks, wage permanent shocks,2 2 2j j j
˜v m y
and wage transitory shocks, respectively) and of the moving average parameter v (for value added) and l (for earnings).
The ratio is calculated as and measures the amount of wage variability attributable to value-2 2 E {[(Dq ) ]Fj }/ E[(Dq ) ]ijt ijt
added shocks. Standard errors of the various estimates are reported in parentheses.
tests. There is a substantial difference in impact between permanent
and transitory shocks: wages do respond to permanent shocks, but the
hypothesis of full insurance against transitory shocks cannot be rejected.
The estimated value of b is economically small (point estimate 0.005)
and not statistically different from zero (a standard error of similar
magnitude). The estimated value of a is 0.069, about 15 times larger,
with a small standard error of 0.025.29 The exogeneity test on rejectsDejt
29 Given that we regress wage shocks against firm shocks, which are common to all
individuals working in the same firm, we correct standard errors assuming that errors are
not independent within a firm (see Moulton 1986).
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the null hypothesis that . The test statistic displays a p-value belowap b
0.1 percent. Thus, while we cannot reject the hypothesis of “full tran-
sitory” insurance, “full permanent” insurance can be ruled out. The J-
test of overidentifying restrictions has a high p-value in both cases, which
indicates that the models are not misspecified. This result also implies
that our instrumental variables estimates are not subject to measurement
error bias.30 The power of the instruments is not a concern, as is shown
by the low p-value of the F-test in the reduced-form regressions (which
checks that the excluded instruments are jointly insignificant).
To allow for an evaluation of the amount of insurance involved, we
use equally weighted minimum distance methods (EWMD) to estimate
the variances of idiosyncratic shocks to value added and (conditioning
on these and the estimated insurance parameters a and b) the variances
of idiosyncratic shocks to earnings.31 Results are reported in panel C.
The estimate of is 0.016 (with a standard error of 0.003), and the2ju˜
estimate of is 0.0426 (with a standard error of 0.0045). It follows that2jv˜
the variance of the permanent shock is 0.0585 and the variance of2ju
the transitory shock is 0.0561. These are both sizable and imply2jv
standard deviations of about 24 percent each. The estimate of the mov-
ing average parameter is 0.07, which is just barely significant.
Next, we estimate the parameters of the idiosyncratic part of earnings,
that is, after filtering the variability that is due to the amount of insur-
ance provided by the firm. The EWMD-estimated variances of idiosyn-
cratic shocks to wages are much smaller than the firm counterpart: ,2jm
the variance of permanent shocks, is 0.0091 (standard error 0.0009),
and is 0.0014 (standard error 0.0005). The moving average parameter2jy
is 0.10 (with a standard error of 0.09, which makes it insignificant).
In summary, our findings imply that a 10 percent permanent change
in firm performance induces about a 0.7 percent permanent variation
in earnings for those employed at the same firm on a continuing basis.
To get a sense of the economic significance of this effect, for a worker
receiving the average salary (i13,363 per year), a permanent 10 percent
decrease in value added of the firm would permanently lower take-home
pay by i90.
30 We can prove that our identification strategy for the sensitivity of wages to the per-
manent component of firm value added is robust to the presence of (a) serial autocor-
relation in , (b) correlation between and , and (c) classical measurement error in˜ ˜ ˜u u vjt jt jt
value added. However, in all these cases the sensitivity of wages to the transitory component
would be estimated with bias because of the presence of invalid instruments. Proofs of
these claims are available on request from the authors. The test of the overidentifying
restrictions indicates that these are not serious concerns; otherwise instrument validity
would have been rejected.
31 An alternative would be to use a generalized least-squares procedure (optimal mini-
mum distance). Our choice is dictated by the evidence presented in Altonji and Segal
(1996) that EWMD dominates optimal minimum distance even for moderately large sam-
ple sizes.
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The variability in compensation induced by risk shifting depends on
(we ignore the reaction to transitory shocks, which is vir-2 2 2a (1 r) ju
tually zero, both economically and statistically). Since the overall stan-
dard deviation of the shocks to wage growth is 0.1245, one can infer
that less than 15 percent of the total earnings variability can be explained
by firm-specific risk (see the last row of panel C of table 7); the rest is
related to worker-specific shocks.32
To get a rough gauge of the social value of the firm as an insurance
provider, suppose that no other devices were available to smooth con-
sumption in the face of wage risk and (for simplicity) assume no worker
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Adapting the simple characterization sug-
gested by Lucas (1987) to evaluate the welfare costs of recessions, sup-
pose that workers maximize and receive stochastic1rU(c )p c /(1 r)t t
earnings , where r is the degree of workers’ relative risk aversion,qtAe
A is a nonstochastic component, and , with2 2q ∼ N(0, j ) j p (1t q q
(this is the variance of the innovation in , i.e.,2 2 2 2 2r) (a br) j  b j q
˜ ˜u v t
). Wage risk depends on a and b, the insurance param-Var [q  E q ]t t1 t
eters; r, the autoregressive coefficient; and the variances and .2 2j j
˜ ˜u v
Lucas assumes that the approximate consumption solution is
2t j /2 qq tc p (1 k)(1 g)e e ,t
where g is the growth rate of consumption per period and k a scaling
parameter. The proportional increase in consumption required to leave
the consumer indifferent between the full-insurance consumption path
( ) and the partial insurance path ( and ) isap bp 0 a 1 0 b 1 0
(Clark, Leslie, and Symons 1994). This provides a reasonable first2rj /2q
approximation to the cost of risk sharing. Under the assumption that
, , , and (values consistent with2 2rp 3 rp 0.4769 j p 0.0160 j p 0.0426
˜ ˜u v
our empirical findings), the proportional increase in consumption that
would leave the consumer indifferent between full and no insurance
( ) is . According to our estimates, the2 2ap bp 1 r(j  j )/2p 0.0879
˜ ˜u v
consumer is fully insured against transitory shocks ( ) and partiallybp 0
insured against permanent shocks ( ). We calculate that work-ap 0.069
ers would be indifferent between the insurance the firm currently pro-
vides and no insurance if their consumption were raised by about 9
percent. Starting with an average consumption of i13,363, say, and no
wage insurance, a consumer would be willing to sacrifice as much as
i1,169 to get the insurance that firms provide, according to our esti-
mates, and just i6 more for full insurance. So the firm proves to be a
very substantial provider of insurance for individuals.
32 Using longitudinal matched data for France, Abowd et al. (1999) conclude that most
of the unexplained variation in earnings levels is due to individual, not firm, effects. We
complement their evidence, showing that most of the unexplained variation in earnings
growth is also due to worker-specific effects.
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VI. Sample Selection, Robustness, and Insurance Heterogeneity
The estimates presented in table 7 are obtained under a number of
assumptions concerning sample selection and the measurement of work-
ers’ earnings and of shocks to firms. Here we show that they are robust
to specific treatment of possible selection induced by the matching of
workers with firms as well as to alternative measures of worker com-
pensation and firm shocks. Finally, we consider the issue of insurance
heterogeneity.
A. Sample Selection
Recall from Section II.B that our sample selection eliminates those who
change position within the firm and those who have multiple employers
over the period of observation (including those with multiple contem-
poraneous jobs in a given year). This was justified by our attempt to
focus on workers with stable employment and tenure patterns. More-
over, we use an unbalanced panel of firms and workers. Finally, by its
very nature our matched data set will tend to overrepresent workers in
large firms and those with characteristics that make them more likely
to be employed in large firms. These criteria could bias our estimates,
though the direction of bias is not obvious a priori. For example, com-
pared to movers, stayers might be more willing to trade wage insurance
for job insurance, in which case their wage would be more sensitive to
firm-specific shocks, so that excluding movers from the sample would
induce an upward bias in the estimated parameters. On the other hand,
movers might be less risk-averse than stayers and thus more willing to
accept wage variability; in this case, their exclusion would bias downward
the estimated sensitivity of wage to performance. For firms, those that
enter and exit might be more constrained financially and hence less
able to provide wage insurance. Finally, the extent of insurance could
be systematically different by firm size.
To assess the importance of these potential sources of bias, we rees-
timate the model (a) including workers who change position within a
firm because of promotion, demotion, or related events; (b) including
those with multiple employers over the sample period (this accounts
for people who quit or are laid off and move to a different employer);33
(c) working with a balanced panel of firms and workers (continuously
observed from 1982 to 1994; this checks whether firms that are in the
sample for fewer years offer different insurance than those that are
33 Since our objective is to study annual earnings growth within a firm (not across firms),
we treat employment spells in different firms as different individual-firm pairs. We correct
the standard errors of our estimates by assuming that the error of the wage equation is
correlated across observations pertaining to the same individual.
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observed for the entire sample period); and (d) using probability weights
to account for the oversampling of workers in large firms.34
The results, reported in columns 2–5 of table 8, are very similar to
those reported in column 1 (the baseline specification) for all the sam-
ples. The sensitivity to permanent shocks is slightly lower in all cases,
except the weighted regression, but it is statistically indistinguishable
from that for the baseline sample. In the balanced sample the point
estimate is less precise because of the much lower number of obser-
vations. The sensitivity to transitory shocks is unchanged and is never
statistically different from zero. We conclude that our results are robust
to sample selection issues.
B. Robustness
One concern is that we have relied on net earnings as a measure of
workers’ compensation; though theory offers no guidance as to whether
firms insure gross or net earnings, it could be argued that firms and
workers contract on gross earnings. Column 6 of table 8 shows results
when gross earnings are used to measure compensation. This change
has little effect on the estimates: the sensitivity to permanent shocks is
slightly larger than in the baseline, as one would expect given the
smoothing effect of progressive taxation, whereas sensitivity to transitory
shocks is small and statistically insignificant.
In our regressions we have related individual workers’ wage shocks
to shocks to their firm’s value added. It might be argued that wage
shocks should be related to the firm’s productivity shock, and our con-
trols may not be enough to capture variation in value added induced
by changes in labor (or capital) inputs. We address this important issue
34 We construct the weights following the suggestion in Wooldridge (2002). First, we use
the random sample of INPS workers and estimate a logit model for the probability that
an observation is in the matched data set as a function of observable characteristics (an
age polynomial, gender, region dummies, sector dummies, and a polynomial in firm size).
In principle, firm size is observed only for workers who can be matched with firms in the
CB data set. In practice, the INPS also collects some limited information on the firms
employing the workers in its database (in particular, number of employees, industry, and
location). We use this to complement the information on firm size available for non-
matched workers and take the average firm size over the period the individual is observed
in the INPS data set as our measure of firm size in the logit regressions. A few individuals
(corresponding to 3.6 percent of the sample) have no observations on this variable and
are therefore excluded from the procedure. Call the estimated probability of inclusionˆpit
in the matched sample (the predicted value of the logit regression, or propensity score).
We obtain the estimates in col. 5 of table 8 by weighting the observations by the inverse
of the estimated probability of inclusion, or . Our procedure delivers consistent esti-1ˆpit
mates under the conditions provided in theorem 4.1 of Wooldridge (2002). In our par-
ticular application the crucial requirement is that the firm shock does not explain selection
into the matched sample conditioning on the variables that we use in our logit regressions
(among which, crucially, we have included firm size). Note that we ignore issues of worker
and firm panel attrition, so the analysis is illustrative rather than full-blown.
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Observations 24,956 28,380 31,975 7,297 24,956 24,956 20,663 24,935
J-test (p-value) .5794 .8441 .8162 .6767 .3789 .5679 .6853 .8750
F-test (p-value) !.0001 ! .0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 .0006 !.0001

















Observations 40,337 45,903 52,697 10,435 40,337 40,337 35,142 40,302
J-test (p-value) .4616 .4636 .4278 .5304 .3207 .4356 .1422 .5158
F-test (p-value) !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001 !.0001
Note.—The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of the sensitivity of wages to value-added shocks (panel A pertains to permanent shocks and panel B to transitory
shocks). See the text for more details on the instruments used in each regression. The J-test is the test of overidentifying restrictions. The F-test is the test of joint insignificance
of excluded instruments. Standard errors of the various estimates are reported in parentheses.
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in the last two columns of table 8. Column 7 shows the estimates when
we use value added per worker instead of total value added and filter it
as usual with our controls (time, location, and sector dummies) to obtain
a measure of the firm-specific shocks. We use employment at the be-
ginning of the period to avoid endogeneity issues and so lose some
observations in the process. Estimated parameters confirm the baseline
findings.
However, even this measure may be inappropriate to capture pro-
ductivity shocks. In a deeper sense, what one is ultimately interested in
is the effect of shocks to the production function once variation in
output due to changes in capital and labor is accounted for. We do this
in column 8 of table 8, where we control for both the log of labor and
the log of capital in the value-added regression. Our measure of capital
is the producer price index–deflated firm’s book value of stock of capital
in structure, machinery, and equipment. The value of equipment is
missing for a few firms, which explains the reduction in sample sizes.
To account for the endogeneity of production factors, we instrument
labor and capital with their lagged values (dated ) and proceed ast 3
in Section III.A to obtain a measure of the idiosyncratic shocks to firm
performance. The results, shown in column 8 of table 8, confirm the
baseline estimates: the response of wages to permanent shocks is 0.071
(standard error 0.026), whereas the sensitivity to transitory shocks is
even smaller than in the baseline case and not statistically different from
zero, implying that the results are not the reflection of mismeasured
shocks to the production function. This suggests that idiosyncratic var-
iations in output are largely due to idiosyncratic shocks to productivity
rather than changes in the amount of utilized primary inputs.
C. Insurance Heterogeneity
Once the full-insurance hypothesis is rejected, one can ask whether the
level of insurance varies systematically with worker and firm character-
istics. The implicit contract model implies that the parameter linking
wages to performance decreases with workers’ risk aversion and in-
creases with the firm’s. The model proposed by Gamber (1988), which
allows for bankruptcy, indicates that wage insurance decreases with the
probability of default because a closer correlation of wages to perfor-
mance reduces the probability of being at the corner of a binding bank-
ruptcy constraint. The principal-agent model (an extension of the im-
plicit contract model that allows for unobservable effort and accordingly
turns on incentive as well as insurance problems, as in Holmstrom and
Milgrom [1987]) posits that the compensation scheme will be more
dependent on performance the more sensitive firm performance is to
worker effort. We should therefore expect that the firm offers less in-
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surance to those employees whose effort is more relevant to perfor-
mance, that is, managers. In addition, principal-agent models predict
that the link between wages and performance will be stronger, the more
precise the signal the principal obtains on the agent’s effort. When the
underlying performance of the firm is noisy and the signal less precise,
we should expect more insurance.
We thus extend the framework described by equations (16) and (17)
to allow the sensitivity of wages to firm performance to vary with workers’
risk aversion, occupation dummies, bankruptcy risk, and historical per-
formance variability (as an inverse indicator of the precision of the
signal).
To classify individuals by risk aversion, we use outside information
from the Bank of Italy’s 1995 SHIW. The household head is offered a
hypothetical security and asked to report the highest price he would be
willing to pay to purchase it, from which a measure of the Arrow-Pratt
index of risk aversion can be obtained.35 We use a matching procedure
based on characteristics observable in both samples and impute a mea-
sure of relative risk aversion to all the workers in the INPS data set. To
reduce misclassification error due to the imputation procedure, we con-
struct an indicator for high risk aversion (a dummy equal to one for
workers with an imputed degree of risk aversion above the cross-sectional
median).36 We proxy bankruptcy risk with the frequency of defaults at
the provincial level37 and take historical performance variability as an
inverse indicator of signal precision. Variability is measured by the stan-
dard deviation of log real value added over the period observed.
Our instrumental variables estimation strategy is modified, allowing
the sensitivity coefficients a and b to depend on observable worker and
firm characteristics. This amounts to including interactions of these
variables with value-added growth shocks, , and augmenting the setDej,t
of instruments by adding the interactions of the original ones with the
relevant worker and firm characteristics.
The results are shown in table 9. The indicator for high risk aversion
is associated with a statistically significant lower sensitivity of wages to
permanent shocks to performance (i.e., more insurance and a lower
35 See Guiso and Paiella (2001) for details on the wording of the question and the
construction of the measure.
36 Direct use of the imputed risk aversion variable in levels gives qualitatively similar
results, although less precisely measured.
37 We have two measures of the frequency of default for each province (the Italian
territory is divided into 95 provinces) and for each year: the number of firms that defaulted
on a bank loan divided by the total number of borrowers at the beginning of the period
and the value of defaulted bank loans divided by the initial value of total outstanding
loans. We summarize the information contained in these variables by using factor analysis
and extracting the first principal component for each province-year pair (see Greene
1997, 424–27). Qualitatively similar results are obtained using either variable separately
or a simple average of two.
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TABLE 9







































J-test (p-value) .3257 .2863
Note.—Standard errors corrected for province clustering are reported in parentheses; the partial for2R
the reduced-form regression is reported in brackets (see Shea 1997). See the text for more details on the
instruments used in each regression. The J-test is the test of overidentifying restrictions.
value of a). In the same direction, managers receive less insurance than
other employees, but standard errors are high and prevent reliable
inference, arguably because of the small number of observations
(scarcely 1 percent of the sample).
In terms of firms, consistent with the basic agency model, those with
higher variability in performance do provide more insurance: the co-
efficient is negative and statistically significant. We interpret this as evi-
dence that incentive schemes are less effective, the noisier the relation
between effort and performance, supporting one of the fundamental
implications of agency theory. Finally, we find that a higher probability
of default is associated with a smaller amount of permanent insurance,
in line with the theoretical prediction, but the standard error is high.
To get a sense of the results in table 9, consider a highly risk-averse
production worker employed in a firm with a historical performance
variability of 17 percent (the median variability of value added in the
matched sample) located in a province with median failure rates. For
this worker, the sensitivity to firm permanent shocks is 0.027. When
these characteristics are retained—but risk aversion is allowed to vary—
the coefficient rises as high as 0.11. For employees of a firm with the
same characteristics but a larger standard deviation—say, 50 percent—
the coefficient declines to 0.018. For employees of a firm with similar
characteristics but in a province at the seventy-fifth percentile of failure
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rates, the coefficient rises to 0.038. As extended versions of the implicit
contract model predict, therefore, changes in worker and firm char-
acteristics may impart a wide range of variability in a.
Note finally that the p-value of the J-test does not indicate misspeci-
fication of the model (33 percent) and that in all cases the power of
the instruments (as measured by the partial of the reduced-form2R
regressions) is great enough to identify the relevant parameters and
dismiss the possibility of finite sample bias.
We repeat this exercise for the sensitivity of earnings to transitory
shocks. In accordance with the results reported in table 7, neither
worker nor firm characteristics matter. This implies that insurance of
transitory shocks to value added is pervasive, even after conditioning
on workers’ and firms’ characteristics.
VII. Conclusions
We offer empirical evidence on the extent of wage insurance within the
firm, based on a matched employer-employee data set for Italy spanning
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. We find that full insurance against
temporary idiosyncratic shocks is provided, whereas enduring distur-
bances to output are only partially—though substantially—insured. Our
estimates also show that the sensitivity of workers’ wages to permanent
shocks is negatively correlated with the workers’ risk aversion and the
overall variability of firms’ performance, as predicted by standard mod-
els of wage insurance. The effects of other characteristics, such as the
probability of bankruptcy and occupation dummies, have the expected
sign but are not well measured. Our results appear robust to a number
of sensitivity checks we conduct on sample selection and the definition
of variables. We believe that this is strong evidence for wage insurance
mechanisms within the firm, with different types of firms providing
insurance packages tailored to different types of workers.
Although the full-insurance paradigm is rejected, the extent of in-
surance coverage is substantial. For the average worker the standard
deviation of wage growth shocks is about 12 percent, and risk sharing
contributes only 1.8 percentage points to it. If temporary shocks were
transferred to workers in the same proportion as permanent shocks, the
variability of earnings would increase by about 15 percent. If no wage
insurance were provided—implying that wages vary in the same pro-
portion as the firm’s value added—the standard deviation of wages
would be as high as 40 percent. These figures, along with a simple
calculation of the social value of wage insurance, showing that workers
would be willing to pay up to 9 percent of their income to get the
current amount of insurance, imply that the firm is a very effective
insurance provider.
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For future work, it would be useful to extend our analysis to countries
with different institutional settings and different degrees of financial
market development, which might influence the role of the firm as
insurance provider. Moreover, the large amount of wage insurance we
estimate begs the question of how firms provide workers with appro-
priate incentives. It would be of interest to assess the relative importance
of different devices for eliciting effort, such as promotions and threat
of termination. Finally, our estimates may be only a partial characteri-
zation of the insurance role of the firm. Besides offering insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks to its performance, the firm may facilitate
the emergence of insurance mechanisms against worker-specific shocks.
These shocks, unlikely to be formally insured in the market for the usual
moral hazard reasons, may be at least partially diversified within the
firm, since workers’ repeated interaction at the workplace favors risk
pooling.
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